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1 Introduction
The citizen-candidate model (Besley-Coate(1997), Osborne-Slivinski(1996))
is being increasingly used to model decision-making in environments where
Condorcet winners may not exist. The model has three stages of activity;
(i) citizens decide on whether to stand for oÆce, and may incur a small cost
if they do so; (ii) citizens vote for the candidates who stand, and the win-
ner is elected by plurality rule; (iii) the candidate who is elected implements
her most preferred policy from a xed set of alternatives. Besley and Coate
call the subgame perfect equilbria of this three stage game political equilibria
(PE). Although the citizen-candidate model is a major advance over existing
models, a major problem is that there are typically multiple equilibria at
the voting stage, due to plurality rule (Dhillon and Lockwood(2000)). These
multiple equilibria at stage (ii) generate multiple equilibria to the game as a
whole. Osborne-Slivinski(1996) resolve this problem by assuming that vot-
ers vote sincerely. Sincere voting, however is an arbitrary rule for selecting
strategies. In contrast, Besley-Coate (1997) impose the requirement that,
conditional on any set of candidates, the voting equilibrium must be weakly
undominated. Not surprisingly, this weak renement at the voting stage still
leaves many equilibria, some of them not very credible
1
.
In this paper, we investigate whether imposing a stronger renement on
the (Nash) equilibrium at the voting stage, conditional on any set of can-
didates, eliminates any PE. Our renement is that voting strategies be it-
eratively weakly undominated. We call PE with this renement imposed at
the voting stage iteratively weakly undominated political equilibria (IWUPE).
Our justication for this renement is twofold. First, that if it is common
knowledge than agents will not play weakly dominated strategies, then it is
"reasonable" that rational voters will not play their "second round" weakly
dominated strategies, and so on. Some formal justication of this is in Ra-
jan(1998). Second, it has been shown by De Sinopoli(2000) that more stan-
1
Besley and Coate declare \for those who would like a clean empirical prediction, our
multiple equilibria will raise a sense of dissatisfaction."
2
dard renements (perfection, properness) do not have much bite in plurality
voting games; in particular, requiring subgame-perfection only rules out Nash
equilibria where Condorcet losers are elected.
De Sinopoli and Turrini(1999) initiated this approach to rening PE in a
paper where they present an example with four candidates and one winner
which has multiple equilibria. In their example, requiring voting strategies
to be iteratively undominated eliminates all but one equilibrium where the
Condorcet winner wins. This result raises the question of whether iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies also renes political equilibrium out-
comes in the case of one, two, and three candidate equilibria. This paper
answers this question, fully and negatively. We show
2
that if there exists a
PE with fewer than four candidates, and a given set of winner(s), then there
also exists a IWUPE with the same candidate set and the same winner(s).
So, this paper complements De Sinopoli and Turrini(1999); together, they
how that iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies also renes po-
litical equilibrium outcomes only when the number of candidates is at least
four.
We describe the Besley-Coate model in greater detail in Section 2. Section
3 then discusses the main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Citizen-Candidate Model of Represen-
tative Democracy
Besley-Coate (1997) consider a community of n citizens, who may select a
representative to implement a policy alternative. Each citizen i 2 N =
f1; :::; ng has a nite action set X
i
representing the policy alternatives avail-
able to him if elected. It is possible that citizens may be of dierent com-
petencies i.e. X
i
6= X
j
. If no-one is elected, a default policy x
0
2 \
i2N
X
i
is selected. Voters have preferences over who represents them, as well the
2
We do not show that every PE is also a IWUPE, but rather that every outcome that
can be achieved via a PE can also be achieved via an IWUPE.
3
alternatives they choose, so utility functions are dened on X  N [ f0g,
X = [
i2N
X
i
; i.e. 
i
(x; j) is the utility for i if j is elected and chooses action
x. If no-one is elected, utilities are 
i
(x
0
; 0):
The political process has three stages. At stage 1, citizens face a binary
decision: to stand for election (enter) or not. At stage 2, voting takes place,
and in stage 3, the elected representatives choose policy. We discuss each
stage in turn.
At the nal stage, once elected, a citizen i will therefore choose their own
most preferred policy (assumed to be unique):
x

i
= argmax
x2X
i

i
(x; i)
Since for every citizen's most preferred point x

i
2 X
i
is known, the induced
preferences of citizens over candidates are given by u
i
(j)  
i
(x

i
; j); i; j 2
N: We assume that these induced preferences over candidates are strict: i.e.
u
i
(j) 6= u
i
(k); all i; j; k 2 N; j 6= k: Also, u
i
(0)  
i
(x
0
; 0):
At the second stage, voting is by plurality rule: each voter has one vote,
which she can cast for any one of the set C  N of candidates who stand,
and the candidate with the greatest number of votes wins. If a set of two or
more candidates have the greatest number of votes, every candidate in this
set is selected with equal probability. Let W  C be the set of candidates
with the most votes, which we call the winset. Then voter payos over some
W are:
u
i
(W ) =
1
#W
X
j2W
u
i
(j); i 2 N
Formally, let 
i
= j if voter i votes for candidate j 2 C:
3
Then  =
(
1
; :::; 
n
) denotes a vote prole. Let W (;C)  C denote the winset,
given the vote prole  and candidate set C. The utility to voter i from 
(given C) is then u
i
(;C)  u
i
(W (;C)): A Nash equilibrium prole 

is
3
We assume there is no abstention. When voting is costless and, as in our version of
the Besley-Coate model preferences over candidates are strict, abstention is always weakly
dominated so that ruling out abstention is without loss of generality.
4
dened in the usual way as a prole where 

i
is a best response to 

 i
; all
i 2 N:
Let S  C
n
be any set of voting proles, with S = 
i2N
S
i
. Say that 
i
is undominated relative to S if (i) 
i
2 S
i
; (ii) there does not exist 
0
i
2 S
i
such that u
i
(
0
i
; 
 i
; C)  u
i
(
i
; 
 i
; C), all 
 i
2 S
 i
, and u
i
(
0
i
; 
 i
; C) >
u
i
(
i
; 
 i
; C), some 
 i
2 S
 i
: Now dene the sequence of sets of vote proles
fA
0
; A
1
; A
2
:::g for i as follows: A
0
= C
n
; and A
n
= 
i2N
A
n
i
; where A
n
i
is the
set of voting actions for i that are undominated relative to A
n 1
; all i 2 N: As
the set of voting actions is nite, A
n
converges after a nite number of steps
to some A
1
; which is the set of vote proles that are iteratively weakly
undominated. It is always non-empty. Also, the A
n
are understood to be
conditional on C:
Besley and Coate dene a voting equilibrium to be a 

which is (i) Nash
equilibrium; and (ii) weakly undominated i.e. 

2 A
1
: We will focus on
a stronger renement of Nash equilibrium i.e. where 

2 A
1
: Formally, an
iteratively weakly undominated voting equilibrium is a 

which is (i) Nash
equilibrium; and (ii) iteratively weakly undominated i.e. 

2 A
1
:
Finally, we turn to the entry stage. Any citizen can run for oÆce, but if they
run, they incur a small cost Æ. If no-one runs for oÆce, the default policy x
0
is implemented. In the rst stage, citizens decide non-cooperatively on their
entry: 
i
2 f0; 1g denotes the entry
4
decision for i. When deciding upon
candidacy, citizens all anticipate
5
the same voting equilibrium 

(C) among
the multiple equilibria at the voting stage, given any possible set of candidates
C. Denote the strategy prole at the entry stage by  = f
1
; :::; 
n
g.
We can now state our equilibrium concepts. A weakly undominated political
equilibrium (WUPE) of this game is a (

; 

(:)) if (i) 

is an equilibrium
of the entry stage, given 

(:) and (ii) (C) 2 C
n
is a weakly undominated
Nash equilibrium in the voting subgame, for every C  N . Our WUPE
is Besley and Coate's political equilibrium: we add the qualier to make
4
We do not allow citizens to randomise.
5
This is represented as in De Sinopoli and Turrini (1999) by the function (:) : 2
N
!
(N [ f0g)
N
.
5
explicit the renement assumed at the voting stage. An iteratively weakly
undominated political equilibrium (IWUPE) of this game is a (

; 

(:)) if (i)


is an equilibrium of the entry stage, given 

(:) and (ii) (C) 2 C
n
is an
iteratively weakly undominated Nash equilibrium in the voting subgame, for
every C  N .
It is helpful for future reference to state the equilibrium entry conditions in
either case, which are rst, that i 2 C must prefer to enter, given 

i.e.
u
i
(

(C

=fig); C

=fig)  u
i
(

(C

); C

)  Æ; i 2 C

(1)
and second, that any j =2 C must prefer not to enter, given 

i.e.
u
j
(

(C

[ fkg); C

[ fkg)  Æ  u
j
(

(C

); C

); j =2 C

(2)
Finally, we state the assumptions we need (in addition to those made by
Besley and Coate(1997)) for our analysis. First, we assume a \no indierence
over lotteries" condition i.e.
NI. u
i
(W ) 6= u
i
(W
0
); for all i and all W 6= W
0
; W;W
0
 N:
This condition ensures that the order of deletion of weakly dominated
strategies does not matter
6
, and thus implies that is important to ensure that
the solution concept we use is well dened. Our second assumption, already
made above, and purely for convenience, is that voters cannot abstain.
3 Analysis
Let (

; 

(:)) be some WUPE, and let C(

) = C

be the equilibrium
set of candidates given entry decisions 

: We will show that as long as
#C

 3; for any WUPE with equilibrium candidate set C

; and winset
W (C

; 

(C

)); there is a IWUPE (

; 

(:)) with the same equilibrium
set of candidates and the same winset - and therefore the same outcome in
terms of policy chosen and political representation.
6
That is, the calculation ofA
1
does not depend on the order in which weakly dominated
strategies are deleted. See Marx and Swinkels (1997).
6
We proceed as follows. First, 

(:) must generate the same winset as


(:) when the candidate set is the equilibrium one:
W (C; 

(C

)) = W (C; 

(C

)) (3)
Second, the incentives to enter must be the same in the original WUPE and
the constructed IWUPE. That is, the entry conditions (1),(2) must continue
to hold when 

is replaced by 

i.e.
u
i
(

(C

=fig); C

=fig)  u
i
(

(C

); C

)  Æ; i 2 C

(4)
u
k
(

(C

[ fkg); C

[ fkg)  Æ  u
k
(

(C

); C

); j =2 C

(5)
So, for any C

with #C

 3; we must show that we can construct some


2 A
1
such that (3)-(5) hold.
Now let 	 be the set of candidate sets comprising C

and those sets aris-
ing from unilateral deviations from equilibrium entry decisions
7
. Note that
conditions (3)-(5) impose conditions on 

(C) when C 2 	: For candidate
sets not in 	; 

(:) can be dened arbitrarily, subject to the requirement
that it is an iteratively undominated prole. That is, we can set


(C) 2 A
1
(C); all C 2 N =	

(6)
where N is the power set of N: Note that (6) is always possible as A
1
(C) is
always non-empty for all non-empty C:
It is helpful to break our complex task into steps by classifying political
equilibria by the number of candidates. Following Besley and Coate, 1997,
say that a political equilibrium is a m candidate political equilibrium if m
candidates stand for election in the equilibrium. We rst have:
7
Formally,
	 = fC  N jC = C

; C = C

=fig; i 2 C

; C = C

[ fjg; j =2 C

g
7
Proposition 1. For any 1-candidate WUPE with equilibrium candidate set
C

= fig; and winset W (C

; 

(C

)) = fig; there is a IWUPE (

; 

(:))
with the same equilibrium set of candidates and the same winset.
Proof. First, 

(:) is dened
8
on 	 as follows. For C = fig; or C =
fi; jg; j 2 N; set 

(:) = 

(:): As we have set 

(:) = 

(:); (3)-(5) hold
from the fact that 

(:) is part of a WUPE. To conclude, we must verify that


(C) is iteratively undominated for all C 2 	: The case C = fig is trivial,
as every voter has only one strategy, so we must have A
1
(i) = A
1
(i) = fig
n
:
In the case C = fi; jg; j 2 N , the only undominated strategy for any voter
is to vote sincerely, so A
1
(C) is a singleton, so again iterated deletion does
not reduce it i.e. A
1
(C) = A
1
(C): 
To deal with two-candidate equilibria, we rst need the following Lem-
mas. Let  (C) be the voting (subgame) with candidate set C: A strict Nash
equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1973) of  (C) is a vector of voting decisions 

where
u
i
(

i
; 

 i
) > u
i
(
i
; 

 i
) all 
i
2 C; 
i
6= 

i
; all i 2 N: We then have:
Lemma 1. Any strict Nash equilibrium 

is iteratively undominated i.e.


2 A
1
:
Proof. A strict Nash equilibrium is a prole of pure strategies (

1
; 

2
; :::; 

n
);
such that each 

i
is a unique best response to the prole 

 i
. Thus, none
of these strategies can be deleted in the rst round. Moreover if this prole
survives for all players at any round k of iterated deletion, they must survive
in round k + 1. This is because iterated deletion means that any player has
the same or fewer strategies at every round, so if a strategy was a unique
best response to a prole which survived round k, it will continue to be a
unique best response to this prole in round k + 1. 
For the proof of the next Lemma, the following notation will be useful. Let
!
 i
(
 i
) be a vector recording the total votes for each candidate; given a
strategy prole 
 i
i.e. when individual i is not included. We suppress
the dependence of !
 i
on 
 i
except when needed and refer to !
 i
as a vote
8
Obviously, C=fig = ;; so (;) is not dened.
8
distribution. Clearly i's best response to !
 i
depends only on the information
in !
 i
.
Lemma 2. Any weakly undominated Nash equilibrium 

(C) of a voting
game  (C); where #W (

; C) > 1 is a iteratively weakly undominated
Nash equilibrium, and remains so even in  (C [ fkg) for any k 62 C:
Proof. Since all candidates in W (

; C) are tied, i.e. !
i
= !
j
; 8i; j 2
W (

; C); it follows that every voter is pivotal between all elements of
W (;C). Clearly, voting for his best alternative in W (

; C) is a unique
best response for any voter
9
. Hence any weakly undominated Nash equilib-
rium 

with #W (

; C) > 1 must be a strict Nash equilibrium. But then by
Lemma 1, 

(C) is also an iteratively weakly undominated Nash equilibrium.
Now consider the game  (C [ fkg). Assume that j is voter i
0
s most
preferred candidate in W (

; C). The vector of votes i faces given 

(C) is
such that (w.l.o.g.) !
j
= !
l
  1; 8l 6= j; and j; l 2 W (C): It is suÆcient to
show that voting for candidate k is not a best response for i in  (C [ fkg).
Note that n  3 since #W (C) > 1; so #C > 1: Therefore, n  4 (otherwise
we cannot have a tie between two candidates in the two candidate game).
Thus, if voter i deviates to k, he would ensure thatW (C[fkg) = W (Cnfjg):
Thus, voting for j remains a unique best response. Thus, 

(C) remains a
strict Nash equilibrium of the game  (C[fkg). Again, by Lemma 1, 

(C) is
also an iteratively weakly undominated Nash equilibrium in  (C [ fkg). 
We now turn to two-candidate WUPE. Note that the entry condition (1)
requires that if there are two candidates, both must be in the winset - oth-
erwise, the one that does not win would withdraw (Besley and Coate(1997).
So, our second result is:
Proposition 2. For any 2-candidate WUPE with equilibrium candidate
set C

= fi; jg; and winset W (C

; 

(C

)) = fi; jg; there is an IWUPE
(

; 

(:)) with the same equilibrium set of candidates and the same win-
set.
9
This also implies, given our NI condition, that all voters will vote for their best
alternative in W (C).
9
Proof. First, 

(:) is dened
10
on 	 as follows. For C = C

; or C = C

=fig;
i 2 C

; set 

(:) = 

(:): For C = C

[ fkg; k =2 C

; set 

(C

[ fkg) =


(C

): Note that by construction, (3),(4) are satised. Also, note that (5)
is satised. First, note that
W (C

[ fkg; 

(C

[ fkg)) =W (C

[ fkg; 

(C

)) = W (C

; 

(C

)) (7)
i.e. given 

; the winner is unchanged if k enters: So, from (7),
u
k
(

(C

[ fkg); C

[ fkg) = u
k
(

(C

); C

)
and consequently (5) holds as Æ > 0:
Again, to conclude, we must verify that 

(C) is iteratively undominated
for all C 2 	: For C = C

; or C = C

=fig; i 2 C

, an argument identical to
the proof of Proposition 1 shows this. For C = C

[ fkg; Lemma 2 implies
that 

(C) is an iteratively undominated voting prole in the game  (C

[k);
as required. 
We now turn to the most complex case, that of 3-candidate WUPE. First,
with three candidates, there may in principle, be one, two or three winners. It
turns out that the case of two winners is impossible under our assumption of
strict preferences. The case of three winners can be dealt with using Lemma
2, following the proof of Proposition 2. However, in the case of one winner,
Lemma 2 no longer applies, and so we must nd some other argument to
construct an IWUPE with one winner. To illustrate our argument, we rst
present an example of a 3-candidate WUPE with one winner where we can
nd an IWUPE with the same outcome.
We need the following notation and lemma before this example. Fix some
candidate set C with #C = 3: Let N
i
be the set of voters who rank candidate
i 2 C as worst, with n
i
= #N
i
. Let q = max
l2C
fn
l
=ng, and let w
i
denote
citizen i
0
s worst candidate in C; all i 2 N . Now dene a critical value of q
as:
q
n
=
(
1 
1
n
 
1
n
d
n+1
3
e; nodd
1 
1
n
d
n+2
3
e; n even
(8)
10
Obviously, C=fig = ;; so (;) is not dened.
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where dxe denotes the smallest integer larger than x; and bxc denotes the
largest integer smaller than x: Finally, in this section, we assume that n 
4:
11
We then have the following useful result, constructed from various results
of Dhillon and Lockwood, 2000:
Lemma 3. Assume #C = 3: If q  q
n
, then any weakly undominated
strategy prole in  (C) is also iteratively weakly undominated i.e. A
1
(C) =
A
1
(C): Moreover, A
1
(C) is a subset of the set of iteratively undominated
strategy proles in  (C [ flg) i.e. A
1
(C)  A
1
(C [ flg):
Proof. Every 
i
2 C except 
i
= w
i
is weakly undominated in C; so
A
1
(C) = 
i
(C=w
i
) (Dhillon and Lockwood, Lemma 1). Moreover, by Theo-
rem 2 of Dhillon and Lockwood, as q  q
n
; A
1
(C) = 
i
(C=w
i
): So,A
1
(C) =
A
1
(C) as required. Finally, consider  (C [ flg): Dene the full reduction of
(C [ flg)
n
; V = 
i
V
i
; to be the set of strategy proles where every 
i
2 V
i
is iteratively undominated relative to V (Marx and Swinkels(1997)). Then,
by denition, V = A
1
(C [ flg): We will show that A
1
(C)  V: To do this,
it is suÆcient to show (i) that every 
i
2 C=w
i
is undominated relative to
(C[flg)
n
and (ii)it remains undominated in every subsequent stage of dele-
tion. In turn, it is suÆcient to show that every 
i
is a unique best response
in C [ flg to some 
 i
in (C [ flg)
n 1
; and that it remains a unique best
response in any subsequent stage of iterated deletion.
To prove this, let ~
i
2 C=w
i
: As ~
i
2 A
1
(C); there exists ~
 i
2 A
1
 i
(C)
such that ~
i
is the unique best response in A
1
i
(C) to ~
 i
. Note that the
support of the set A
1
(C) consists of pure strategies that are a unique best
response to some prole which is also in A
1
(C): Thus, consider the rst stage
of iterated deletion in the game  (C [ flg). We know that the set A
1
(C)
 A
1
(C [ flg); because A
1
(C) = A
1
(C)  A
1
(C [ flg). Thus no strategy
in A
1
(C) is deleted in the rst round if we can show that ~
i
continues to be
the unique best response in A
1
i
(C) (and hence in A
1
(C [flg)) to ~
 i
; when
voter i can also choose l:
To see this, let ~
i
= j and note that since q  q
n
for  (C), ~
i
is a
11
This is w.l.o.g since we only need this for the proof of the main Propositions.
11
unique best response to the prole ~
 i
where i is pivotal between exactly
two alternatives w.l.o.g fi; jg  C. Thus, the vote distribution !
 i
(~
 i
)
must have one of the two alternatives (i; j) in C getting two or more votes
when n  4: So, voting 
i
= l in response to ~
 i
cannot aect the outcome,
and so ~
i
remains a unique best response in  (C [ flg) to ~
 i
: This proves
that every pure strategy in the support of A
1
remains a unique best response
in A
1
(C [ flg). In particular, the strategy prole ~
 i
also cannot be deleted
in the rst round.
Moreover, if ~
i
; ~
 i
; are not deleted in the rst round they cannot be deleted
in any subsequent round since no new strategies are added. 
This is a powerful result which allows treatment of the 3-candidate case.
Example
There are eight citizens with preferences over N as follows:
1 : 1  8  5  3  2  4  6  7
2 : 2  8  1  3  5  4  6  7
3 : 3  8  5  1  2  4  6  7
4 : 4  8  5  3  1  2  6  7
5 : 5  8  1  3  2  4  6  7
6 : 6  8  1  3  5  2  4  7
7 : 7  8  1  3  5  2  4  6
8 : 8  5  3  1  2  4  6  7
Let (

; 

(:)) represent a WUPE in this game, with an equilibrium set of
3 candidates C

= f1; 3; 5g; and one winner, W (C

; 

(C

)) = f5g: We
will rst describe 

(:) and verify that it does induce the equilibrium entry
decisions. Then, we will show that there is an IWUPE with the same set of
candidates and winset.
Description of 

(:)
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First, (C

) = (5; 1; 5; 5; 5; 1; 3; 5); thus candidate 5 wins. This is a Nash
equilibrium, since no voter is pivotal, and moreover, the prole is undomi-
nated ((C

) 2 A
1
(C

)) as no-one votes for their worst candidate.
Voting proles and winsets in all the two candidate games generated by
withdrawal of one of the equilibrium candidates are as follows:
(C

=f1g) = (5; 3; 3; 5; 5; 3; 3; 5); W (C

=f1g) = f3; 5g
(C

=f3g) = (1; 1; 5; 5; 5; 1; 1; 5); W (C

=f3g) = f1; 5g
(C

=f5g) = (1; 1; 3; 3; 1; 1; 1; 3); W (C

=f5g) = f1g
It is clear that withdrawal is suboptimal for all candidates. For example,
if candidate 1 withdraws, he gets a lottery over 3 and 5 which is worse for
him than 5: Finally, note that all these voting proles are undominated Nash
equilibrium ones, as there are only two alternatives and voting is sincere.
Next, note that if 

(C) 2 A
1
(C [ fjg); j = 2; 4; 6; 7; then j cannot win in
 (C [ fjg): This is because j is ranked worst in C [ fjg = f1; 3; 5; jg by all
players except j himself, an is a dominated strategy to vote for one's worst
alternative. So, in equilibrium, j = 2; 4; 6; 7 will not enter, as required.
Finally, consider subgame  (C

[f8g):We set (C

[f8g) = (C

): This
is an undominated Nash equilibrium, as shown above. Moreover, W (C

[
f8g) = f5g; so that 8 has no incentive to enter, as required.
Construction of the Equivalent IWUPE
Let 

(:)  

(:) on 	: It is then obvious that 

induces the same
entry behavior as 

:It remains to check that 

(C) is iteratively undom-
inated for all C 2 	. First, in  (C

), note from (8) that q(C

) = 3=8 <
q
3
8
= 1=2: Hence by Lemma 3 above, 

(C

) 2 A
1
(C

) for all i. Next, in
 (C

=fig); 

is iteratively undominated, as there are only two alterna-
tives (formally, 

(C=fig) 2 A
1
(C=fig); i 2 C). Finally, in  (C

[ flg);


(C) 2 A
1
(C) = A
1
(C

[ flg); again by Lemma 3. k
We ncan generalise the arguments used in this example to prove:
Proposition 3. For any 3-candidateWUPE there is an IWUPE (

; 

(:))
with the same equilibrium set of candidates and the same winset.
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Proof of Proposition 3. We divide the proof into three parts: (A) where
three candidates win, (B) where two candidates win and (C) where only one
candidate wins.
(A) Assume that C

= fi; j; kg; W (C

) = C

: Now dene 

(:) on 	 as
follows. For C = C

; or C = C

=flg; l 2 C

; set 

(:) = 

(:): For
C = C

[ fmg; m =2 C

; set 

(C

[ fmg) = 

(C

): Then, by an identical
argument to that of the proof of Proposition 2, (3),(4),(5) are satised.
Again, to conclude, we must verify that 

(C) is iteratively undominated
in  (C) for all C 2 	: Since W (C

) = C

; #W (C) > 1 so by Lemma
2, 

(C

) is an iteratively weakly undominated Nash equilibrium in  (C

)
and remains so even in  (C

[ fkg) for any k 62 C: This leaves the two
candidate games  (C=flg); l = i; j; k : here there is nothing to prove as
with two alternatives, an undominated Nash equilibrium is also iteratively
undominated.
Case(B): We show that a 3-candidate WUPE where two candidates tie is
impossible in our framework with strict preferences. Suppose that such a
WUPE exists: C

= fi; j; kg; W (C

) = fi; jg: Then we must have i; j
getting equal numbers of votes. Since votes are split equally between two
candidates, n  4 (since there are three citizen candidates) and n is even.
Moreover, all voters are pivotal, so the unique best response for a voter is
to vote for her preferred alternative in fi; jg: So, we know exactly half the
voters prefer i to j and vice versa.
Also, since this is a WUPE, the entry conditions for the three candidates
are satised. For i; j this implies that entry costs are suÆciently low, and for
candidate k it must be that the outcome if he does not enter is less preferred
by him to a tie between i; and j. W.l.o.g. let W (C

=fkg) = fig; and let
k prefer j to i: This implies that in  (fi; jg); i wins. In turn since only
equilibria with sincere voting are possible in the two candidate voting game,
this implies that a majority of citizens prefer i to j, a contradiction. So, case
(B) cannot arise.
Case (C). Assume that C

= fi; j; kg; W (C

) = fig: We prove rst that in
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this case there must be at least 4 voters:
Claim 1: If a three candidate WUPE in case (C) exists, then n  4.
Proof in the Appendix
Now dene 

(:) on 	 as follows. ForC = C

; or C = C

=flg; l 2 C

; set


(:) = 

(:): For C = C

[ fmg; m =2 C

; set 

(C

[ fmg) = 

(C

):
It is clear from the construction of 

that 

gives the "correct" entry
incentives i.e. (3),(4),(5) are satised.
We now take all the voting sub-games  (C); C 2 	 in turn, and show
that 

(C) is indeed iteratively undominated in these games.
1.  (C

=flg); l 2 C

: As  (C

=flg) is a two-candidate game, 

(C

=flg) is
clearly iteratively undominated.
2.  (C

): First, we show that in this game, q(C

)  q
n
: We show this by the
following two Claims:
Claim 2: n
j
(C

)  dn=2e and n
k
(C

)  dn=2e:
Claim 3: n
i
(C

)  n  d
n+4
3
e
These two claims are proved in the Appendix. Now, by denition, and from
the Claims,
q(C

) = maxf
n
i
(C

)
n
;
n
j
(C

)
n
;
n
k
(C

)
n
g = maxf
n
2
; n d
n + 4
3
eg  q
3
n
where the last inequality follows by inspection of (8). So, by Lemma 3,
A
1
(C

) = A
1
(C

): So, 

(C

) 2 A
1
(C

) as required:
3.  (C

[ l); for any l =2 C

. By Lemma 3,  (C

[ flg); 

(C) 2 A
1
(C) 
A
1
(C

[ flg); so again 

(C

[ flg) 2 A
1
(C

[ flg) as required. 
4 Conclusion
In this paper we show that we cannot rene the set of WUPE outcomes
for one, two and three candidate (pure strategy) equilibria . Intuitively it
is easy to see why renements become easier with the four candidate case.
Consider WUPE where one candidate wins in a four candidate race. Unlike
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the entry conditions in the three candidate case, the entry conditions in the
four candidate case involve three candidates (and 5 candidates) and hence
may involve insincere voting, thus imposing fewer restrictions on preferences
(e.g. in the example we needed n
1
; n
3
 n=2). In the proof of Proposition
3 above, since two candidate elections involve sincere voting only, n
j
and n
k
were restricted to be less than half of n. Such a restriction would not arise
in the four candidate case, and it is easy to nd WUPE outcomes that are
not supported by any IWUPE.
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Appendix
Proof of Claim 1. It is suÆcient to show that if a WUPE exists, then
n > 3; since there are three candidates. Let the three citizen candidates be
i; j; k: Let W (C) = fig as before. Suppose to the contrary that a WUPE
exists with n = 3. Since a WUPE exists, i enters because he wins against
the other two. Thus in  (C), n
i
 1. Moreover, j (k) enters because he
prefers i to k (j) and it must be that  (C fjg) = k ( (C fkg) = j): since
n = 3 two candidates cannot tie. Thus n
j
; n
k
 1. Thus n
i
= n
j
= n
k
= 1.
W.l.o.g let N
i
= fjg { this is a contradiction to the entry condition for j (i.e.
j prefers i to k). 
Proof of Claim 2. Since a WUPE exists, candidates j; k must have some in-
centive to enter. In particular, we cannot have W (C

=fjg) = fig (otherwise
from (1), j would not enter), so (i) W (C

=fjg) = fkg or fi; kg and more-
over, j must prefer i to k; otherwise gain, j would not enter. A symmetric
argument implies that (ii) W (C

=fkg) = fjg or fi; jg:
Since the only undominated Nash equilibrium with in two candidates is
sincere voting, (i) and (ii) imply that at least half the voters prefer j to i
and at least half the voters prefer k to i: So, no more than half the voters can
rank either j or k as worst. 
Proof of Claim 3. Since there is a WUPE where i is the unique equilibrium
outcome in the game with three candidates, it must be that a suÆciently
large number of voters have i as a top or second ranked alternative among
the three i.e. n
i
must be suÆciently low. We look for the maximum n
i
that
is compatible with i being a unique winner. Thus, we can assume that all
!
i
= n n
i
i.e. all n n
i
voters vote for i. Note that in such an equilibrium,
by the example we have maxn
i
> 0.
In such an equilibrium it must be true either that (i) !
i
 max(!
j
; !
k
)+2
or that (ii) only two candidates i, j get any votes at all. To see this, suppose
rst that (i) is not true. Then the vote prole is w.l.o.g !
i
= !; !
j
= !   1
and !
k
 !   1. Consider any voter m 2 N
i
: It is suÆcient to show that no
voter would vote for k { thus assume he votes for k. Then he faces a vote
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prole !
 i
such that (a) !
i
= !; !
j
= !   1 and !
k
 !   2. But then he is
strictly better o voting for j since that ensures a tie.
Thus, in case (ii) the only case in which i can emerge a unique winner is if
all m 2 N
i
vote for j and the maximum votes that j can get (= n   n
j
) is
strictly less than ! = n   n
i
. This implies, n
i
< n
j
: But this is impossible
(Claim 1 { in the 2 candidate game between i; j, j must be in the winning
set).
It remains to check case (i) i.e. the prole !
i
 max(!
j
; !
k
) + 2. Thus we
have the following constraints
12
:
!
i
= (n  n
i
)  max(!
j
; !
k
) + 2 (9)
max(!
j
; !
k
) = d
n
i
2
e (10)
Combining the two, we have:
d
3n
i
2
e  n  2 (11)
From inequality (11) and the requirement that n
i
is an integer we have:
d
2
3
(n  2)e  n
i
(12)
Thus:
n
i
n

1
n
b
2(n  2)
3
c = 
Note that b
2(n 2)
3
c is an integer if and only if d
n+4
3
e is an integer. Hence
b
2(n 2)
3
c +d
n+4
3
e = n ; 8n; from which we get:
 = 1 
1
n
d
n+ 4
3
e (13)
But then (12) and (13) yield the right result. 
12
Thanks are due to an anonymous referee who suggested this part of the proof.
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